French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific, or When France Makes Light of Its Duty to Remember by Tetiarahi, Gabriel
On 13 June 1995, when President Jacques Chirac announced a final
round of a dozen nuclear tests [in French Polynesia], his irrevocable deci-
sion caused concern and dismay. Without bothering at all to first consult
the Polynesian people, he committed an act of gratuitous violence against
these people and their representatives, political parties, churches, labor
unions, and nongovernmental organizations. It felt like a planned assas-
sination of this child—all the future generations carried by the mothers
in their wombs, their pu fenua—by the new occupant of the Elysée [the
French “White House”]. 
Of course, Chirac could always count on his constant “brother,” the
president of the territorial government, Gaston Flosse. His campaigns—
spread by the media of the Hersant group and by Radio Overseas France
in favor of the tests’ harmlessness and of the 1,000 new jobs that the pro-
gram would generate—could not change the public opinion of the great
majority, under the morally aggressive blow.
Demonstrations, support from throughout the Pacific region, and the
massive presence of international media accompanied the testimonies of
those who had directly suffered from the explosions, whether atmospheric
or underground. The riots in Papeete were only the logical outcome of an
act of violence committed by two dignitaries, Jacques Chirac and Gaston
Flosse. In looking elsewhere for the culprits, the police and courts failed
in their mission. The nuclear criminals were successive presidents of the
French Republic, from De Gaulle to Chirac, and not the Polynesians, who
were more victims than culprits. 
They had also tarnished the image of France. Chirac decided then to
end the tests once and for all in January 1996. The opponents of nuclear
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testing could hardly cry victory, however. Would France wash its hands
of the experiments, without taking into consideration the impact of atomic
testing on the environment and especially the health of veterans, both civil-
ian Polynesian workers and French soldiers? 
From its side, to clear its conscience, France commissioned a radiolog-
ical study by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its conclusions were
made public at the French Pacific University in Papeete, but far from calm-
ing concerns among Polynesians, the results raised fears.1 The conclusions
contradicted in a shocking manner the information from previously classi-
fied military sources, according to which Moruroa and Fangataufa would
not be contaminated. Thirty-five years of lies, and in addition, no inves-
tigation of the aerial tests had been conducted.
Seeking another truth, the Evangelical Church and the network of non-
governmental organizations, Hiti Tau, are working together with the sup-
port of European organizations to give voice to the former workers who
agreed to break the silence that surrounded the nuclear crime sites. The
conclusions of a study published in 1997 are revealing. Children as young
as ten to fourteen years old were enlisted to work on Moruroa. We
thought slavery had been abolished in 1848. Access to medical files is still
cloaked in secrecy. Under such conditions it was easy for military doctors
to claim there was no link between the rise in cancers among the work-
ers and the radioactivity of the experiments.
Conferences held in 1999 in the very heart of the National Assembly in
Paris, in which a few French parliamentarians participated, hardly
pushed the highest authorities of the French State to admit finally that
France had not conducted clean tests, let alone admit their impact on the
health of Polynesians, for whom ceaseless reports of thyroid cancers, the
highest rate in the world among women, became daily worries. 
The reelection of Chirac in 2002 did nothing to change his will to
remain mute on the repercussions. He could, traditionally, ally himself
with his constant brother Flosse, who emerged victorious in the ballot
boxes in 2001 and continued to receive generous economic support from
the French State.2 A reconversion fund fed annually by 18 billion cfp in
French subsidies was put in place as compensation. A judicial immunity
(naturally supported by the Free Masons) cloaked all the exaggerations
and diversions of the local government. Directives were given to the
French high commissioner in Polynesia to be increasingly lenient about the
legality and the legitimacy of the territorial government. Look at the polit-
ical contract that bound for life the two powerful men of the Union for
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the Presidential Majority (ump) of the heir of General De Gaulle in Paris
and the Tahoeraa Huiraatira [party] in Papeete, from whom the Elysée
demanded, in exchange, a blind silence about the Polynesian requirements
of truth and transparency about the atomic experiments—and a total
adherence to Chirac’s will to favor a more massive immigration of French
citizens into the Islands, without any administrative obstacles that might
hinder their establishment from the viewpoint of acquiring land or jobs.
In addition to this price that the Polynesians pay today so that France can
keep a few pieces of “confetti” from its former colonial empire in the
South Pacific, the local government began, under pressure from the French
state, a long and meticulous task of erasing the collective memory of the
Polynesians.
For a long time, from 1963–1996, the Maohi sacrificed human lives at
Moruroa and at Fangataufa while permitting France to undertake “the
construction of its nuclear force” and to conserve in the Security Council
of the United Nations its rank of a mid-level world power. And Chirac
recalled that during his last visit in July 2003, “France owes a lot to Poly-
nesia, which enabled it to keep its national independence.” Since 2002, and
a long time before that, the Polynesians have never succeeded in obtaining
from their government’s president another look at their health agonies. He
and his entourage consider the attachment to France as only a rampart to
avert crises like those in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. There is
manifestly worse that sleeps in the bowels of Moruroa and Fangataufa.
When the time of awakening to the escaping radioactivity comes, it will
perhaps be too late. There is no worse inheritance to leave to future gen-
erations than that of radioactive contamination. And yet that is what the
two brothers Jacques and Gaston decided to give as a destiny to the indige-
nous people of the Pacific, to the Maohi and the rest of the countries of
the liquid continent, the Pacific. Such a stubbornness not to feel concern
for the dangers and risks that peoples incur is a crime against humanity.
In closing, the article by Jean-Marc Regnault clearly raises questions for
the reader about the role of the French Pacific University in the region but
also about the indoctrination of young students’ opinions into a uniform
system of thought that its teachers choose to serve, without scruples and
without dissent. There is no greater evidence than to say that the univer-
sity chose the camp of those who think that France owes nothing to the
Maohi Nation, from the perspective of the health of the former workers
of Moruroa and Fangataufa.
If the occupants of the Elysée and of Matignon refuse to recognize the
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responsibility of the French State for the consequences of the testing
program conducted in the Tuamotu Islands for thirty-five years, it shows
clearly that French arrogance, so suited to the Rassemblement pour la
République [Chirac’s Rally for the Republic party] and now to the Union
for the Presidential Majority, has chosen not to distance itself from the
shores of the Pacific. And yet, it no longer has its place here. 
Section Editor’s Notes
1 The International Atomic Energy Agency report of 1998 concluded that no
remedial action was needed to clean up Moruroa or Fangataufa atolls and that
no ongoing environmental monitoring was necessary. However, it did admit that
early aboveground testing had deposited five kilograms of plutonium in the bot-
tom of Moruroa lagoon and three kilograms in Fangataufa lagoon, that another
five hundred kilograms of plutonium waste lie in sealed cavities under the atolls,
and that the radioactive tritium in Moruroa lagoon is ten times higher than in the
surrounding ocean, because of leakage through cracks in the atoll rock. In short,
the report said that contamination had occurred, but that it would not affect the
sea around the atolls for centuries. Yet no geological study has been conducted of
the atoll, and no statistics were collected to show how the radiation at the times
of actual testing affected neighboring populations; moreover, a significant part of
the data used in the report was supplied by the French government and was val-
idated with independent samplings, under French supervision, only “when prac-
ticable.” Sources: “The Legacies of Moruroa and Fangataufu,” published by WISE
News Communique on 21 August 1998 <http://www.antenna.nl /wise/496/4906
.html> and “What Lies Beneath: Assessing the Impact of France’s Nuclear Tests,”
by Sandra Radu, Harvard International Review 2003–2004 <http://hir.harvard
.edu/articles/index.html?id=1007>.
2 Since this essay was written, Flosse was defeated in the 2004 election and
replaced as president of French Polynesia by Oscar Temaru, who is pursuing the
contamination issue with France.
